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Background 
Lev Trotskii, by the autumn of 1923, had begun to criticize his rivals 
in the party leadership (triumvirs Iosif Stalin, Grigorii Zinov’ev, and Lev 
Kamenev) openly. In a letter to the Politburo in early October, he at-
tacked the party’s economic policy; and condemning appointmentism, 
that is, the new tendency to make appointments to party positions rather 
than hold elections, he faulted the new-found lack of democracy in the 
party. Forty-six party members signed the “Declaration of the 46,” sup-
porting his views and calling for an extraordinary conference of the Party 
Central Committee (CC) to discuss them.
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 Instead, on October 25-27, 
1923, a joint meeting of the CC and the disciplinary body, the party Cen-
tral Control Commission (CCC), convened to discuss both Trotsky’s let-
ter to the Politburo and the Declaration of the 46 in support of him. The 
conclave censured Trotskii. Passions rose on all sides and drew into the 
debate members of older factions, including the Workers’ Opposition and 
the Democratic Centralists. Increasing agitation in party cells over the 
declaration forced party leaders to broaden the discussion in early No-
vember.
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Meanwhile, foreign affairs intruded into the debate. Soviet com-
munists paid close attention to German politics in 1923, a year of hyper-
inflation and political unrest in Germany. When the uprising of the Ger-
man Communist Party (KPD) failed in Hamburg in late November, the 
debacle intensified conflict in the Russian party.
3
  
The turmoil in party cells reached a fever pitch in December 1923. The 
Trotskyists and Democratic Centralists decried the government’s neglect 
of heavy industry and the lack of ‘democracy’ within the party. Trotskii 
tried to harness the energy of young party members and Komsomolists, 
claiming that a generational divide existed in the party. Rather than siding 
with either Trotskii or the triumvirs, Aleksandr Shliapnikov and Sergei 
Medvedev held their own views and appealed to supporters in several 
ways. Firstly, they wrote and promoted a resolution in party cells. Sec-
ondly, Shliapnikov spoke at party meetings, most visibly at the Khamov-
niki district party conference in Moscow in January 1924. Thirdly, he 
wrote an article which was published in Pravda in January 1924.
4
 
The debate ended with the Thirteenth Party Conference, 16–18 Janu-
ary 1924. Few supported Trotskii’s views at the party conference, elec-
tions to which the triumvirate had manipulated in its favor. Trotsky was 
condemned, the triumvirate prevailed and Trotsky went south to recuper-
ate from malaria attacks. On the way he heard of Lenin’s death on 21 
January, but did not return to Moscow for the funeral. His absence from 
that event struck a blow to his prospects for the succession. Shliapnikov 
and his comrades were pleased with the conference’s decision to admit a 
massive number of workers into the party. The number of one hundred 
thousand recommended by the conference was increased after Lenin died 
(the ‘Lenin levy’). As a result, in February to May, two hundred and forty 
thousand workers joined the party.
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Introduction to the Baku Letter 
In January 1924, near the close of intraparty discussion, Sergei 
Medvedev responded to a request by like-minded individuals in Baku, a 
major center of the oil industry on the Caspian Sea, for information about 
his and Shliapnikov’s stance on the current party debates regarding indus-
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trialization, the peasantry, Comintern tactics, and intraparty democracy. 
He sent documents and a letter, addressed to Valerian Barchuk, a former 
metalworker employed by the Commissariat of Enlightenment in Baku. 
The letter was discovered when Azerbaijani police arrested some of the 
people in Barchuk’s circle to which Medvedev had sent it. In the context 
of a split between Zinov’ev and Kamenev on the one hand, and Stalin on 
the other, in 1925-1926, the letter became the pivotal issue in a CCC in-
vestigation of Shliapnikov and Medvedev on charges of factionalism.
6
  
Stalin, Nikolai Bukharin, and other leaders criticized the document 
based on the version the CCC received from Baku which has not been 
published. Medvedev delivered a “corrected” version to the CCC in July 
1926; this version was published in Russian only in 1990. The published 
version of Medvedev’s letter is identical to documents I found among 
Medvedev’s personal papers in the Central Archive of the Federal Securi-
ty Service of the Russian Federation (TsA FSB RF).
7
 Shliapnikov’s CCC 
file contains a comparative layout of both versions.
8
 The version that Ba-
ku authorities sent to the CCC had stylistic, grammatical and spelling er-
rors uncharacteristic of Medvedev and a few significant differences in 
content. One whole paragraph in the Baku version was missing from the 
version Medvedev offered in 1926 as a copy of the original. Unfortunate-
ly, I could not find any copy that was signed by Medvedev and hence 
clearly the original from January 1924. Therefore it is not certain how 
closely the version transmitted from Baku might resemble the original. It 
is possible that some divergences stemmed from intentional doctoring, 
while others were due to careless copying. Medvedev might have made 
careless errors in the original and corrected them in the 1926 version. 
Whether insertions were made by the Azerbaijani police or members of 
the group in Baku is open to conjecture, although a consultation of police 
files in Baku should be undertaken.  
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There were substantive differences between the Baku version and the 
one Medvedev offered as the genuine version. The version seized in Baku 
made it seem as if Medvedev had given up hope that European workers 
could be revolutionary; at the same time he assessed Comintern methods 
in Western Europe as flawed. In the Baku version Medvedev appears to 
disagree with the Comintern’s assessment of European Social Democratic 
governments as bourgeois. Medvedev’s version has no such statement. 
Finally, the Baku version presented him as an advocate of large-scale in-
dustrial concessions and foreign loans at the cost of major losses for the 
Soviet state. Such differences raise the suspicion that police organizations 
could have introduced distortions in order to cast a negative light on 
Medvedev and/or his comrades in Baku. Much of the criticism party 
leaders made of the document was based on the distorted passages. 
Therefore in making the document available in English, it is important to 
highlight the differences between the two versions. 
Below I italicize the sections where Medvedev’s purported original 
differs significantly from the version transmitted from Baku, and I place 
in brackets the relevant segment from the version authorities in Baku sent 
to the CCC. 
 
Sergei Medvedev’s Letter to a Baku Comrade 
“Dear comrade V., 
We
9
 received your
10
 letter and materials about the discussion in Baku. 
We saw and talked with comrade Kobyzev.
11
 From the letter as well as 
from discussion with comrade Kobyzev it became clear that you still 
don’t know about our article published in Pravda on January 18, 1924. It 
was written and submitted to the editors of Pravda on December 20, that 
is, when even here in Moscow, the discussion was unfolding ever more 
broadly. All positions by that time had been defined and in our article we 
gave a clear stance toward all questions, placed for discussion. It’s very 
unfortunate that this article didn’t make its way to you. In any case you 
will now have it – we are sending it with comrade Kobyzev, and together 
with it we are sending a clarification of our general positions – the steno-
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graphic report of comrade Shliapnikov’s speech at the Khamovniki dis-
trict party conference where he gave a report, and a copy of the resolution 
which we introduced chiefly in worker cells. Examine these attentively 
and you will find answers to the basic questions in your letter. Keep in 
mind that in these materials we define only the basic direction of party 
policy, not touching on separate features of it in various areas. In this let-
ter I treat only those aspects which perhaps after familiarization with the 
indicated material [phrase omitted from version 2] will still be insuffi-
ciently clear for you. 
1. About your resolution it’s necessary to say this: it incorrectly de-
fines the role and significance of the CC’s internal party policy. One 
should never forget that this area of party policy is a derivative, subordi-
nate area. It is defined by the party’s fundamental and all-defining eco-
nomic policy. 
And this last, in the end is the result of the correlation of class forces 
in our country, their proportion and strength in the country’s general 
economy. It is defined directly by the social composition of our party, 
where the working masses compose only one-sixth or one-seventh of its 
members [class forces of our side, its proportion and the economic 
strength of each social class in the country’s general economy, the result 
of the correlation of each group’s proportion in our party’s current com-
position, where worker groups, where the working masses compose just 
one-sixth or one-seventh part of its members]. Thus we define the de-
pendence of intraparty policy [significance of intraparty policy and so 
forth], clarifying it as such in our documents. It would be deeply incorrect 
to think that it’s possible to divide various areas of party policy into sepa-
rate – completely independent parts and then, sharing the basic economic 
policy of the CC – to successfully and logically criticize those separate 
parts or features of its policy, which in their essence are a direct result of 
the content, character, and direction of this economic policy. This mistake 
is the basic flaw of your resolution. It is aggravated even more by the fact 
that in your attempts to defend your resolution, you emphasize that you 
are not criticizing or, more accurately, are not linking your disagreements 
on questions of intraparty policy to the general policy of the CC. Here in 
Moscow we have the “September Opposition” (comrades Preobrazhen-
skii, Piatakov, Smirnov and others) – which on this basis was smashed 
and completely demoralized. This inescapably could occur with you as 
well, if in Baku in official party circles there were more experienced 
[propertied]
12
 politicians. 
                                                 
12. Искушенные [имущественные] 
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2. a) In questions about economic policy – we do not share the general 
character of it that the CC gives it in its resolution and which it possesses 
in reality [omitted from version 2]. I say “general character” – not be-
cause we were supporters of all particular features of this policy. Far from 
it. But in this letter I must be brief and so, touching only on the funda-
mentals of this policy, I leave aside its individual features. The main all-
defining feature in the CC’s resolution “on immediate tasks of economic 
policy” is that in this resolution all large state industry is designated as an 
appendage to the small peasant household. All that is doomed to downsiz-
ing [shattering], to so-called “concentration” and only where such a re-
duction can elicit the outright indignation of the working masses who are 
doomed to long-term unemployment, only at that moment will this reduc-
tion or “concentration” give way to considerations of a political character. 
But it’s obvious, that this only eliminates the reduction itself, but not by 
one iota does it solve the question of the actual preservation and expan-
sion of our centers of industry and of revolutionary proletarian forces. He 
who knows or is at least interested in the brief history of our industry, will 
easily see, that never in its chief areas, – metallurgy and machine build-
ing, coalmining and oil, fuel extraction in general – was it, in its origins 
and development, based on the peasant household but instead rested on 
railway, highway construction, on the uninterrupted [omitted] expansion 
of all industrial [omitted] branches of the economy, supplying them with 
materials, machines, instruments [omitted] and so forth, on the growth of 
the urban economy and [omitted] on enormous resources “for defense of 
the country” [quotation marks omitted]. The entire peasant world con-
sumed an insignificant sum, in comparison with these consumers, and 
was not even a significant aid for these branches of heavy industry. And 
now when the CC proclaims, that for state industry this peasant market is 
the limit beyond which it cannot go, that namely in this direction it will 
solve all questions of industry, – we, naturally, see in such a policy a di-
rect threat to heavy industry and to the very existence of the working 
class. And most of all to the achievements of the working class, which it 
secured by means of the October seizure of power [And most of all to all 
but for the working class, the conquerors of the October seizure of pow-
er]. 
I can give you here a concrete example of the situation in which such a 
policy puts, for example, the Baku oil industry. Since we now have signif-
icant [enormous] supplies of kerosene, gasoline and mineral oil, and since 
demand for them for now [omitted] is very limited, in accord with the 
general economic policy of the party which has been decreed – the entire 
Baku and Grozny oil refining and processing industry will be downsized 
and all oil extraction will be focused only on procuring unrefined oil. This 
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means that we will have an inescapable reduction of worker cadres in the 
indicated branch of the oil industry, and together with that the contraction 
[improvement]
13
 of our material base.   
This is the basic character of the party’s economic policy, outlined in 
the CC’s resolution [omitted] for the immediate period of time in power. 
In it is concealed, in our opinion, a great danger to the interests of the 
working class and the further fate of Large State Industry. 
b) This danger will become even more threatening, if we look at still 
another feature of our intraparty policy, at the attitude of party leaders, 
supported by [omitted] the overwhelming majority of members – toward 
the “new economic policy.” 
Until recently they have portrayed [associated] this policy as a maneu-
ver in keeping with socialism. 
By means of this maneuver they meant temporarily, under the pressure 
of cruel necessity, to give some space to the petty bourgeois capitalist 
pressure of the peasantry and the rural and urban [omitted] bourgeoisie 
engaged in trade (which are inseparably linked to the peasantry), in order 
to revive and consolidate the material base of our supremacy, large state 
industry, [omitted] with maximum energy, and with the help of fortified 
state industry to begin to struggle with the inescapable growth of NEP 
and with private capital on the free market. 
Now almost no one presents the question in such a way. On the contra-
ry, now we hear almost entirely of near rapture over this policy, dictated 
to us by a force hostile to the proletariat and in this way attesting to the 
fact that “from need this policy is transformed into the highest political 
virtue,” that this policy ceases to be represented as a forced retreat [free-
thinking attitude] from our conquests, by its very price to save them; ra-
ther, it increasingly is depicted as our only conceivable economic [and 
reasonable] policy, which would be the policy of strengthening all ac-
complishments of the working class as a result of the October Revolution, 
the policy which is directed toward and in essence consists of the consol-
idation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
So, if you will pay attention to this criticism of the so called “new eco-
nomic policy,” which in fact is a direct expression of the interests of the 
petty bourgeois peasant and urban masses, – whose political pressure it 
was proclaimed it would weaken, – then the emphasis on the transfor-
mation of large state industry is just an appendage to the economic policy 
of the small-holding peasant household, to the limited household uses and 
personal demands of the peasant masses themselves, - and [this course] 
                                                 
13. Сужение [улучшение] 
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becomes even more threatening to the fundamental conquests of the 
working class.  
c) We’ve come to the point that for every million employed, we have 
over a million unemployed. 
The further accelerated development of agriculture, in the first in-
stance [omitted] of kulak and more or less [rather more] well-off
14
 or the 
so-called “serednyak” [omitted] masses of peasants, being [was] a deeply 
progressive phenomenon for our exhausted economy, will inescapably 
lead to the displacement of the less economically secure [alleviated] 
peasant masses and former workers before anything else will flood cities 
and towns. 
Already now this influx is becoming more and more massive. Along 
with this, after the impending [omitted] recognition of us in Europe, we 
will enter into closer [greater] contact with the world market, and this 
means, that our own state economy must catch up [be equal] to economic 
development in Europe. 
As concerns the development of our agriculture, which is largely 
[overwhelmingly] based on the small peasant holder, it must catch up to 
international [omitted] markets, selling its products not only in Europe 
but also in America, and this will intensify the displacement, the self-
expulsion of the weaker of these farmers in our countryside and will push 
toward the towns more and more masses of the ruined ones. If state in-
dustry seems to be in a bad situation at this moment [at one moment], 
when we cannot secure work even for the currently unemployed, then it 
can be even worse, if [at that moment we can seem thrown off from our 
current pedestal of power by] a small group of Bonapartist swine would 
try to overthrow us [omitted] and in attempting to do so might not meet 
the necessary resistance from those enormous unemployed masses of the 
towns [omitted], fragmented by poverty, which might in their situation 
seem not only passive, but in their suffering, might even relate sympathet-
ically to such a confluence of events, in the hopes that the victory of pri-
vate capital, although it would condemn them to cruel exploitation, would 
not allow them to expire from hunger. And such a mood could be found 
not only among unemployed workers, but even among those who work 
and who live under constant expectation of layoffs. 
If such a misfortune were to befall us, we would still less be able to 
count on the rural poor supporting us. 
Not in vain was it unarguably established during discussion that these 
rural poor are leaving the ranks of the party. 
                                                 
14. состоятельных 
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Thus, we do not share the policy of the CC, which in the main for the 
nearest period will be directed toward its own preservation, its reinforce-
ment and even the development of the petty peasant economy; which ba-
ses all industrial policy only on its current needs [extirpations]. 
We think that the petty peasant household, under NEP and depending 
on the international market, is doomed to stagnation in barbarian condi-
tions and to inevitable [omitted] ruin. 
All efforts to save it, to help it resist and even develop in its current 
form [omitted] – are reactionary-utopian attempts. 
The solution for these doomed peasant masses can lie only in develop-
ing state industry, where the rural masses could find application for their 
hands and strengths. 
Any support of the illusions of small peasant holders that Soviet power 
must and will save them from destruction, while preserving capitalist 
competition and free trade, will only corrupt them politically [their con-
sciousness] in so far as these illusions are confirmed; [small peasant hold-
ers will make] constant demands on the government, to make up with var-
ious subsidies from its means the difference between the cost of the prod-
ucts of their labor, as it is defined on the one hand according to the world 
market and on the other by that minimum of resources, which are neces-
sary to them for their personal and economic existence. These features in 
our economic policy exist right now. In the future under that economic 
policy, which the CC outlines in its resolution [omitted], confirming the 
possibility of a seemingly broad development for the small peasant econ-
omy, – these features will inescapably expand, will exhaust the already 
deficit state budget and will lay an even more colossal burden on the 
working class, for all these subsidies the government will spoon out 
chiefly, as the resolution of the CC says, “from the income of state enter-
prises and state property,” that is from increasing the exploitation of 
workers in state industry. 
That part of the rural population, which remains, with the exception of 
the masses as indicated, is the rural kulak bourgeoisie, which is no less 
hostile to us than is the old sort of bourgeoisie. 
We can only conduct a cruel political struggle with it. 
This is the main essence of our disagreements on questions of party 
economic policy. We see in this policy the prevalence of the interests of 
that six-sevenths of its composition, which are petty bourgeois elements, 
and not the reinforcement of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the 
economy as well as in politics. 
What do we offer as a counterweight to this policy: 
a) the transfer of the chief center of economic policy from the peasant 
economy to large industry, to its resurrection, to its expansion, its devel-
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opment, to the employment of all state resources particularly in this direc-
tion. This policy will serve the vital interests of the proletarian masses of 
the towns, as well as the interests of those semiproletarian masses of the 
countryside, who all the more will be ruined for the reasons shown above 
and as if in mockery of them – this expansion will be all the more de-
structive for them, the more plentiful the harvests, for particularly in these 
conditions the products of their labor will be more devalued.  
This policy will [further] serve our communist goals. It is the only cor-
rect and really possible [omitted] communist policy, capable of securing 
for us the most painless resolution of the question of the petty [omitted] 
peasantry and of solidifying its political union with the working class in 
our republic [omitted]; 
b) when introducing such proposals, usually they frighten you with 
questions:  where to get the resources for this?  We don’t have them. We 
answer thus:  if we don’t have enough resources for this, then we have in 
the current budget anyway such resources that go not toward the devel-
opment of the large state economy, but to support the petty bourgeois 
economy of the well-off part of the peasantry and to support the utopian 
illusions of the small-holding peasantry indicated above, which our party 
itself consolidates with this layer of the peasantry [to development of the 
policy outlined by us, and partially to support those utopian illusions of 
the small-holding peasant economy, which the overwhelming majority of 
our party supports in this layer of the peasantry]; 
[We know, however, that these resources are insufficient. And we de-
mand that the government search more energetically for resources by way 
of foreign and internal state loans and granting concessions, and with 
greater losses than those our government was prepared to allow for upon 
being granted such credits.] 
c) we consider that in our country’s current economic condition, with 
those perspectives for it [omitted], of which I spoke above, [which await 
us] great material sacrifices to international capital, which is ready to go 
toward the revival of our dormant [violated] industrial regions, - is a less-
er evil, than that condition in which we are and can be found in recent 
years in the area of our industrial and agricultural economy, the condition, 
which can seem for us ruinous. 
To think that we can with that [role and] specific gravity of the work-
ing class, which it has in state policy, gather the necessary masses of capi-
tal for the turn around of ruined industry by way of income and property 
[omitted] taxes, – means to amuse oneself with futile illusion. 
To think that these masses of capital we’ll put together only more pro-
tractedly “penny by penny, nickel by nickel” [out of nickels only more 
protractedly] from that same industry [omitted], this means to supplement 
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the [former] illusion of the small-holding peasantry [omitted] with the il-
lusion of petty bourgeois imitators of the towns [omitted]. For such a way 
of accumulation we would need half a century. We still don’t know what 
period of time it will take for us to emerge from the deficit of our state 
budget. Only empty-headed windbags can speak in this circumstance 
about actual [omitted] accumulation.  
These are our basic disagreements with the economic policy of our 
party and the existing policy in the countryside. The results of these poli-
cies at the current moment already bear down on the working masses as 
weights, in the future they will become heavier. 
To think that in the future they will patiently bend their backs, – means 
not to see surrounding phenomena, or not to understand their signifi-
cance. 
3) Our party’s international policy – as is any party’s such policy, – is 
the continuation of our internal policy in the international arena. 
That which distinguishes [mitigates] our policy within the country, are 
the same features it brings to a significant degree to the international area. 
Its basic flaw consists in that it wants to see everything in the light of our 
country’s experience. 
The so-called “Worker-peasant government,” coming to replace the 
“Worker government” – is an expression of [omitted] a hopeless attempt 
to resolve the basic problems of the West European workers’ movement 
by the means and methods of our country. This leads to failures, willingly 
or unwillingly, but this policy constantly discredits the role of the better 
organized and more conscious masses [circles] of the Western European 
proletariat and tries to find for itself support in its less conscious elements 
and in the “peasantry” of the Western European countries. But such a 
peasantry, which we had up to the moment of our revolution, doesn’t ex-
ist in Western Europe. It exists in the Near and Far East. But we now 
know what the attempt to rely on the peasantry came to, for example, in 
Bulgaria. This Comintern-dictated attempt led to the downfall of the Bul-
garian Communist Party. 
We know just as well that even in peasant Finland the slogan “worker-
peasant government” has fewer chances [least liabilities] than anywhere 
else. 
Such is the chief direction of our international policy. It also defined 
the character of Comintern tactics, which they tried to impose in Germa-
ny, Italy, and France. In all these central European countries, which have 
a decisive significance for the international revolution, this tactic led to 
the fact that from the general mass of the proletariat’s organized forces, 
the forces of the communist part of it were torn out and were set in oppo-
sition to the remaining mass of the proletariat, as the more revolutionary 
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parts against those supposedly incapable of conscious participation in the 
revolutionary demonstrations of the working masses. The more they dis-
organized the general working class movement and the communist part of 
it, the more they isolated it from the general mass of the organized prole-
tariat and they deprived it of steady influence on the masses from outside 
their ranks. We are the bitterest opponents of this policy. We see no pos-
sibility to speed up the course of events in Western Europe toward revo-
lution, while standing apart from and against the overwhelming mass of 
the organized working class. We are for the communist working masses 
to remain the constituent part of the working masses, organized in trade 
unions, cooperatives, soviets, factory committees and so forth, so that any 
attempts to seize power in these organizations, bypassing the will of the 
overwhelming mass of their members, or to create an organization isolat-
ed from the masses would be decisively rejected, as a venture which dis-
organizes the workers’ movement. 
This, in general outline, is our attitude toward the question of interna-
tional policy. 
If the support of the Western European proletariat was necessary for us 
up to now, then now, when our links with Europe are broadening and tak-
ing shape, this support is a hundredfold more necessary to us. But with 
that policy of constantly discrediting the more organized and conscious 
workers, which we defended and conducted through the Comintern, we 
arrived at full isolation of the working masses of our country from the 
proletariat of the Western European countries and to a similar isolation of 
the communist part of the latter from the bulk of the masses in Western 
Europe. 
Attempts to artificially graft our methods of work onto all Western Eu-
ropean countries lead only to what we see, for example, in Norway. From 
this example it’s especially obvious, how these attempts have literally led 
to the disorganization of that country’s worker movement; to the emer-
gence of materially feeble “communist” sections and to their maintenance 
on the account of the Russian working masses, for which they paid with 
blood and sacrifices, but which they cannot use for themselves under cur-
rent conditions. 
In fact there is being created a horde of petty bourgeois servants, sup-
ported by Russian gold, depicting themselves [which for Russian gold de-
pict themselves] as the proletariat and allegedly as representatives of 
[representing] the “revolutionary workers” of the Comintern. 
Those methods, by which the Comintern tries to conquer the Western 
European working masses – are obviously hopeless. [But the soil, on 
which the Comintern feeds – the Western European working masses – is 
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obviously hopeless.] They not only do not bring us closer to the organized 
international proletariat masses, but on the contrary, estrange us. 
Seeing these misfortunes, its leaders, in the persons of our party lead-
ers, seek support for their policy outside of the masses and preach, for ex-
ample, that American tenant farmers are more revolutionary, than the 
American organized working masses. 
From here, naturally, it remains to take just one step toward these 
farmers, and they will turn out to be that fundamental base of “com-
munism,” on which must be staked the entire activity of American com-
munists. Similar quests occur in all other European countries. They are 
evidence that the Comintern’s policy, as guided by our party leaders, as a 
consequence of failure in the proletarian masses, is imbued with strivings 
toward the petty bourgeois property-owning classes. These classes are all 
the more often juxtaposed to working class associations, as the more ca-
pable of carrying out a socialist revolution, which lacks only organized 
leadership. 
If such leadership is secured for them in the person of the communist 
party, they they will be the first in completing a socialist revolution. This 
is the basic flaw of all our international policy. 
This flaw explains all the systematic persecution and discrediting of 
Western European proletarian-class associations, which still do not follow 
communist slogans. [It explains such a discrediting of social democratic 
government in general, such as the current labour government in England. 
The latter pretty often is depicted as a government of the bourgeoisie. We 
cannot agree even one iota with such policy and tactics.] It is disastrous 
for the cause of the real socialist revolution.  
Our evaluation of Western European Social Democratic parties deeply 
departs from those evaluations, given by our leaders. 
They regard all leading cadres of these parties as traitors, lackeys of 
the bourgeoisie and so forth. And this relates to the German just as well 
as to other Social Democratic parties. 
This fact alone is enough to reject a similar characterization of these 
cadres as explaining nothing and to doubt that they are the [peoples as 
the] chief reason why in Western Europe the bourgeoisie still reigns. It is 
obviously not Marxist and leads us to a dead end. 
Given such an explanation of the bourgeoisie’s supremacy, there is no 
ray of hope ahead, since [indeed] all the most conscious, organized and 
disciplined working class cadres, from which are organized all leading 
circles of Western European socialist parties, are traitors and so forth. 
Then who is the actual bearer of the socialist revolution [omitted]? 
In fact, these elements in the eyes of the broad working masses of the 
Western European states [omitted] not only do not betray any working 
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class interests, but on the contrary, from the point of view of the proletar-
ian masses, they are most devoted to their interests. 
Therefore Social Democrats are still strong and powerful. Therefore 
they still can utilize the deep trust of the proletarian masses. 
Namely a Marxist analysis can easily explain such an evaluation of 
these parties and leaders by broad masses of the workers [omitted]. The 
entire solidity of their link with the working masses and the masses’ 
wholly deep trust in them is explained by the fact that these Social Demo-
cratic party leaders never subordinated the working masses’ overall eve-
ryday needs to various individual demands by the party regarding the in-
terests of the revolution. On the contrary, they see their interests chiefly 
in the satisfaction of the everyday [improvements of the] needs of the 
working masses. 
At times they are willing to consider as a revolutionary goal the suc-
cessful resolution of these partial [omitted] needs for broad circles of the 
worker masses through shortening work time, through raising their pay 
and through elevating their role in government or community administra-
tion. And since the international proletariat has many such needs, then 
there’s nothing unnatural in entrusting the whole leadership in their 
struggle namely to those who present them not with red pipedreams in the 
form of a wider perspective, but to those who capably defend them from 
everyday adversities. 
That is the soil, on which is formed the Western European socialist 
parties’ devilishly durable link with the working class of their countries, 
which we have so far observed, despite the occasionally really criminal 
behavior of their parties’ leading circles in important [separate] moments 
of these masses’ struggle.  
Departing from such an evaluation of the role of socialist parties and 
their leaders, we say that for the conquest of the Western European work-
ing masses, the Comintern does not need to constantly discredit as traitors 
organizations that unite the proletarian class and their leaders. By such 
means you’ll not win them over. To achieve this goal it is necessary to 
gather patience and skill to defend the everyday needs of the working 
masses, in order to reveal before them more intensively the whole illusion 
of proposals that the satisfaction of such needs will essentially change 
their social and material situation. 
It’s necessary to decisively reject all attempts to realize a socialist rev-
olution by circumventing the conquest of Western European proletarian 
mass organizations. 
Finally, it’s necessary to change resolutely the relations with these or-
ganizations, which have formed up to now. 
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We think that the actual situation is such that our organizations such as 
Profintern, in fact are willingly or unwillingly, a weapon of alienation of 
both the Russian working masses and the Western European communist 
masses from resolute masses of all the proletariat. It is a direct obstacle, 
not at all justified in fact, on the path to formation of an actual unified 
front of the working class of each country and on an international scale. 
This is the basic thing that separates us from current party leaders 
[policy] in questions of international policy. 
4. Now regarding the death of comrade Lenin. 
His loss is, understandably, an important and painful event. But all is 
relative in this world. We are by no means in such a hopeless mood re-
garding the future, as some of our party circles. And in this we are shored 
up by the fact of the mass entry of workers into the party ranks. This in 
our opinion coincided with comrade Lenin’s death, but was not a direct 
consequence. This is the second act of that revival of Russia’s worker 
masses which began in August and September with mass strikes aimed at 
the improvement of their desperate situation. In this act we perceive the 
more active mass elements’ attempt to find in the party the lever for 
changing their difficult material situation, in which they are found even 
now, to force it to defend the interests of the mass of workers in its eve-
ryday policy and work. This factor we regard as cause for rejoicing not 
only for our country’s working class, but also for the party and for us per-
sonally. 
Regarding this phenomenon [omitted] we experience the deepest satis-
faction with our efforts to make our party truly a workers’ party. Whatev-
er worker elements this movement captures, we see in it a boon. 
It doesn’t concern us if these are not the most conscious elements. On 
the contrary, this confirms our rather great hopes that the party namely 
under the influence of these elements, which are perhaps less conscious 
but more broadly based, will have to rise to defend a policy which will 
link it more closely with workers’ interests, since namely these elements’ 
direct interests are the interests of the working masses, and their direct 
pressure to a great degree is capable of securing today’s immediate in-
terests more so than the pressure of more conscious circles of these 
masses [namely these elements’ interests are the interests of the masses to 
a greater degree than we’ll say the direct interests of today’s more con-
scious circles of the masses]. 
This new entry must exert influence on the party’s economic policy. 
To close a factory where there are 10-15 communists out of 500, for ex-
ample is a lot easier to do than when 150-200 or even 60-100 are com-
munists. This alone is sufficient to gladden us. It’s necessary only, of 
course, not to be beaten down by that banality which is proposed in con-
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nection with this phenomenon, supposing that all these workers surged in-
to the party “in order to study Leninism,” and that it is necessary quickly 
to organize as many party lectures, courses, schools and so forth as possi-
ble. It’s necessary to see a direct danger in such a welcome, which can 
quickly chase out of the party’s ranks not only those entering now but al-
so those who were in the party earlier. 
Now about the results of the discussion. 
As with the question of the “new course,” so the discussion and its 
outcome in no way were linked with Lenin’s death. This course and dis-
cussion of it arose long before any suggestion of Lenin’s possible demise, 
even before [at] the all-Russian conference. 
This means that it is impossible to connect all these events. You will 
find an answer to your main question – “indeed has everything come to 
nothing,” in our January 18, 1924 article in Pravda, where we clearly ex-
plicated, how it came to be that since the Tenth Party Congress worker 
democracy was laid to rest in the CC’s depths. You’ll find even more ex-
planation in the stenographic report of Comrade Shliapnikov’s paper. 
All this seems so simple and clear, as if there were no special need to 
explain this circumstance.  
We perceive that already before the Tenth Congress our party became 
so socially differentiated, that it nearly fell apart as a result of bitter dis-
cussion. This is the first thing. The second is that at that same congress 
and afterwards the CC gave itself the task, no matter what, to create party 
unity, which, it was understood, was threatened from the outside by the 
possibility of a new civil war. Third, the “Workers’ Opposition” was the 
only faction, which had a future in the working class, therefore all whips 
and scorpions, stipulated by secret points of the resolution on “unity” 
were directed precisely against supporters of the “Workers’ Opposition,” 
[that is] against supporters of the need to resolutely protect [policy not in] 
the direct interests of the proletarian masses of our country. 
Fourth, could the CC under such conditions implement within the par-
ty principles of workers’ democracy? Of course not. Implementation of 
these principles would on the next day have confronted it with worker el-
ements in the party uniting around the “Workers’ Opposition” and would 
have made absolutely impossible that economic policy which it mapped 
out at the congress itself and which in the future would assume such a 
character that it would be directly aimed against the interests of the mass-
es, at least on the issues of loans for gold, bread and other things. 
Implementation of principles of workers’ democracy would not have 
allowed the implementation of that “concentration,” which is the curtail-
ment [omitted] of the economy, which became the essence of the CC’s 
policy already from that time. 
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Well all that to one side, but from the other – the overwhelming petty 
bourgeois composition of the party itself which could be an active sup-
porter of bourgeois democracy but not of workers’ democracy, that is, a 
democracy that would not only guarantee each party member’s active 
participation in party activity, but would obligate it moreover to direct 
this activity toward working class interests, to infuse it with the workers’ 
spirit and interests. These two basic conditions determined the fact that 
the resolutions of the Tenth Congress, despite the presence in it of essen-
tial limitations on the principles of worker democracy, nevertheless re-
mained unrealized. 
Ask yourself, have any of these conditions essentially changed. If so, 
then in what direction, and then you’ll give yourself a clear answer to 
your question. Now this circumstance, like a thunderbolt, struck all work-
er elements in factories and higher education, who in some places sup-
ported rather energetically the “September opposition.” Now they’ve be-
come bitterly disappointed in their illusions both in the possibility of im-
plementing worker democracy, given the party’s current composition, and 
in the “September opposition.” But all this disillusionment and bitterness 
is just a result of their illusions and nothing else. It would be sad, if you 
were to yield to such illusions and would reap disillusion from them. 
We are convinced that it will not be difficult now for you, on the basis 
of these materials, to resolve all questions regarding the period just expe-
rienced and in the present. 
With this I must finish my letter. 
I intended to write briefly, but in fact as you see it became a whole 
brochure, but if this will help elucidate questions still not clear to you, I 
will not regret that I spent two whole days writing you this letter. 
In conclusion I express our sincere desire that you would more solidly 
link up with those new worker cadres which doubtlessly are responding in 
your region to the all-Russian phenomenon of workers’ entry into the par-
ty. 
If these writings did not clarify everything, don’t pass up a convenient 
opportunity to get in touch, then it’ll be possible to provide additional in-
formation to you. 
 
With communist greetings from all of us
15
 
     (Medvedev) 
 
                                                 
15. Under NKVD interrogation in 1935, Medvedev named those he meant by “all 
of us” as: Mikhail Mikhailov, Mikhail Chelyshev, Ivan Nikolaenko, Genrikh Bruno, 
Aleksandr Pravdin and Aleksandr Shliapnikov (TsA FSB, R33718, d. 499061, vol. 5, 
ll. 28–31). All these had supported the Workers’ Opposition in 1920-1921. 
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One last urgent and ardent request. 
If you need to preserve this letter, even for a little while, please try to 
type a copy of it for yourself on a typewriter and return this original to me 
no matter what. I did not write this letter quickly. This explains some 
carelessness, necessitating corrections. During the writing itself I was in-
terrupted and called away a hundred times, so you’ll figure out for your-
self what kind of insertion is called for and where. I can’t rewrite the let-
ter. I repeat, try to return it to me no matter what, and if possible, in a 
short time. [circa 20 January 1924] 
 
Conclusion 
In 1923–1926 Shliapnikov and Medvedev perceived the policy of So-
viet leaders as increasingly favorable to the peasantry and they worried 
about its implications for the development of industry and the growth of 
the working class in Russia. They saw the New Economic Policy echoed 
in international affairs, as Bukharin and other party leaders allied with 
Stalin looked towards less industrialized countries in Asia to spread revo-
lution. Shliapnikov and Medvedev fretted that party leaders were on a 
path that alienated more advanced workers from communist policies in 
European Russia. They shared their views with supporters, but only spoke 
publicly during periods of official debate in the party. Recognizing that 
factional struggle would only back them into a corner, they sincerely dis-
approved of it, but they remained strong advocates of free intra-party dis-
cussion. Urging their supporters to remain within the party, they did not 
formally ally or join other oppositionist factions or blocs. Nevertheless 
Stalin’s supporters in the party and secret police kept changing the terms 
of political struggle and the definition of party discipline so that in 1926 
Shliapnikov and Medvedev were found guilty of factionalism based on 
the private letter to a comrade in Baku translated above. 
